This discussion paper poses four questions.
Introduction
Public servants have been managing networks for years but either chose not to talk about it or like Moliere's Monsieur Jourdin, did not know they had been speaking prose all their life.
The idea is not new, although it can seem novel; it was just temporarily misplaced. Words like diplomacy, trust and reciprocity are central to managing networks.
When do networks succeed?
Networks thrive where markets and hierarchies fail, where trust and reciprocity characterise the relationships between organisations, and where management is by negotiation, not command.
This much is obvious from Table 1 . Also, as with any other form of public sector management, success depends on the relevant information, skills and resources. When actors hoard information and resources, when in effect they refuse to share, then the cooperation that defines networks is unlikely to be forthcoming. The existing literature also identifies several other more specific conditions under which networks will thrive; see  Quality cannot be specified or is difficult to define and measure.
 Actors need reliable, 'thicker' information, or local knowledge.
 Commodities are difficult to price.
 The policy arena is insulated from party politics.
 Service delivery is localised.
 Central monitoring and evaluation incur high political and administrative costs.
 Implementation involves chains of organization and there is the prospect of many ownership disputes.
 There is a shared narrative or overlapping narratives of what we are doing and why.
Source: Updated from Rhodes 1998 and citations.
In other words, networks succeed when service delivery is cooperative, depoliticised, professionalised, localised, and customised.
When do networks fail?
Networks, like all other resource allocation mechanisms, are not cost free. (Flynn, Williams et al. 1996: 115 and 136-7) . In short, contracts undermine trust, reciprocity, informality and cooperation.
Individuals cope with the clash between cooperative and competitive styles by drawing on folk theories; on their inherited stories of how things work around here (see below). They can live in this mixed world. They calculate which service delivery mechanism will work in which context. But the dilemma is pervasive. They miscalculate which message to send to other actors or which setting is appropriate for their message. Their frustrations can be heard
in exasperated yet heartfelt pleas for other agencies 'to be more like us'.
The problem of many hands (or accountability vs. efficiency) Bovens (1998, 46) identifies the 'problem of many hands' where responsibility for policy in complex organizations is shared and it is correspondingly difficult to find out who is responsible.
He also notes that fragmentation, marketization and the resulting networks create 'new forms of the problem of many hands' (Bovens 1998, 229) . In a network, the constituent organizations may hold the relevant officials and politicians to account but to whom is the set of organizations accountable. Performance indicators may enhance efficiency but, in a multi-agency context, buck-passing is much more likely because responsibility is divided and the reach of central agencies is much reduced (Mulgan 2003, 211-14) . All too often, networks are closed to public scrutiny; they are a species of private government. The brute fact is that multiple accountabilities fuel fears of duplication, overlap and inefficiency as they weaken central control and foster a 'not me guv' response from network members (Mulgan 2003, 225) .
The holy grail of coordination (or control vs. mutual adjustment)
The search for coordination has a centralising thrust. Its advocates seek to coordinate departments and other agencies -whether of the centre, the states or local government, whether public or private -by imposing a new style of management on other agencies. A command operating code, no matter how well disguised, runs the ever-present risk of recalcitrance from key actors and a loss of flexibility in dealing with localised problems.
Gentle pressure relentlessly applied is still a command operating code in a velvet glove.
When you are sitting at the top of a pyramid and you cannot see the bottom, control deficits are an ever-present unintended consequence.
What we see here is an age-old problem dressed up in fashionable phrases. That problem is coordination. We know that, despite strong pressures for more and proactive coordination throughout Western Europe, the coordination activities of central governments remain modest. According to Wright and Hayward ( 2000: 33) : coordination has four characteristics. (ii) Even when cooperative, anchored at the lower levels of the state machine and organised by specific established networks, coordination is sustained by a culture of dialogue in vertical relations and of integration at the horizontal level.
(iii) It is rarely strategic, so almost all attempts to create proactive strategic capacity for long-term planning … have failed … (iv) It is intermittent and selective in any one sector, improvised late in the policy process, politicised, issue-oriented and reactive Coordination is the 'philosopher's stone' of modern government, ever sought, but always just beyond reach, all too often because it assumes both agreement on goals and a coordinator (Seidman 1975: 190) . Network members complain that 'you can't shake hands with a clenched fist'.
But coordination is not confined to central coordination by rules. There are alternatives. The all-too often ignored but classic book on informal coordination is Lindblom's (1965) analysis of partisan mutual adjustment. A partisan is a decision maker who makes decisions calculated to service his or her own goals. Mutual adjustment occurs when a decision maker either simply adapts to decisions around him or seeks to induce changes in other decision makers.
There is no central authoritative decision maker. Rather, each decision maker seeks to induce others to adjust using such methods as bargaining, reciprocity, manipulation, and compensation (see also , Chisholm 1989 
Top down vs. bottom up
We know from studies of implementation and of street level bureaucrats that top-down initiatives are often confounded. Top-down models of implementation take the government's stated policy objectives as the starting point and examine why they do not succeed (see for example: Pressman and Wildavsky 1984) . Failure is attributed to a diffusion of intent as multiple agencies become involved, lack of compliance, understanding or both. Oversight, monitoring and stronger direction from the centre are common palliatives often with little effect. The view from the bottom-up is different; it highlights that implementation is mediated through the actions of front-line workers whose perspectives reflect local conditions, local knowledge and professional expertise. For example, Lipsky (1979: xii) argued that 'the decisions of street level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with the uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out'. My account of networks takes it as axiomatic that they are messy and amorphous and that central agencies may intervene but cannot control.
Organizational glue
The notion of organizational glue overlaps with many other notions; for example occupational culture, institutional memory, and administrative culture. All have in common the idea that the inherited beliefs and practices of members of an organization are the social glue that binds an organization together. Networks are no exception, with the obvious proviso that an incipient network will have little or no inheritance and so little in the way of 
Rules of the game
Many networks operate in the shadow of hierarchy; that is they are dependent on central agencies for legal authority and financial resources but are at arm's length for implementation. In turn, because they include the private and voluntary sectors, the networks provide more resources for central agencies. Networks are a bridge to civil society. The role of central agencies is to set the parameters to networks actions by, for example, strategic planning. The problem with strategic planning is that it can become a millstone around the network, daunting in its length, detailed prescriptions, and wealth of performance indicatorsand that is before it is overtaken by events. It need not be so; for example, one senior British government Minister brought in his department's strategic plan scribbled on one sheet of A4
paper. His strategic plan was a signpost for the department, not an A-Z street map.
Collaborative Leadership Ansell and Gash (2008, 544) define collaborative governance as a collective decision-making process "where one or more public agencies directly engages non-state stakeholders" in the "formal, consensus oriented, and deliberative" implementation of public policy or management of public programmes. The key question is whether opposing stakeholders can
